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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Research shows that rent 
control incentivizes landlords 
to at least temporarily 
withdraw housing in response 
to price increases—the 
opposite of what 
policymakers intend. 
 
n Rent control is unlikely to 
be a standalone solution to the 
underlying problem plaguing 
expensive cities: chronic 
undersupply of housing.
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After a long period of neglect, a new generation 
of policymakers and activists has embraced rent 
control as a solution to the housing affordability 
crisis plaguing America’s booming coastal cities. 
The national median rent for a one-bedroom 
apartment is $1,209 a month, but for some metro 
areas it is considerably higher. Urban residents 
suffering from the highest rents are mostly in 
wealthy, coastal cities, such as San Francisco 
($3,500), New York City ($2,860), San Jose 
($2,480), Los Angeles ($2,360), Oakland ($2,100), 
and Washington, D.C. ($2,160). In addition to 
sharing astronomically high rents, these cities also 
share another feature: rent control.
Rent-control regimes have operated in 
these six cities for the better part of 30 years, 
and they exist also in a host of smaller cities, 
chiefly in California, Maryland, and New Jersey. 
Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you 
think that rent control is essentially a rent freeze, 
but the reality is that rent control as practiced 
today has evolved into a far more complex system. 
The vast majority of today’s rent controls were 
instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response 
to the stagflation crisis, and are often referred to as 
rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or second-
generation rent control to distinguish themselves 
from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these 
modern forms are really the only game in town, I 
refer to them herein as just rent control.
Policymakers claim that rent control can allow 
low- to moderate-wage workers to live close to 
jobs in expensive cities. They also claim that these 
rent-control policies would prevent families from 
being displaced by high rents into substandard 
housing. Even for families who stayed, the rent 
controls would mean that they could more easily 
afford other necessities, like food and health care. 
This concern applies particularly to low-income 
or fixed-income households, such as the elderly 
and disabled. For example, Oakland’s rent control 
ordinance claims to address a “severe housing 
affordability crisis,” in which “60 percent of . . .  
residents are renters, who would not be able 
to locate affordable housing within the city if 
displaced.”
The regimes share four prominent features:
1) The city grants landlords and tenants some 
freedom to negotiate a starting rent, and then 
caps subsequent rent increases according to 
agency decree or prescribed formula. This 
process, called vacancy decontrol, ranges from 
restrained in New York City and Washington, 
D.C., to completely unrestricted in California.
2) There is automatic lease renewal for existing 
tenants, and landlords usually require “just-
cause” to evict a tenant. In practice, this means 
that landlords must prove to a rent board or 
court that tenants are being evicted for one of 
a predetermined list of reasons. This prevents 
landlords from turning over tenants at will and 
locking in new base rents in response to market 
shifts.
3) New buildings are exempt from rent control 
unless the landlord opts in. Policymakers fear 
discouraging new supply, so the rules control 
only existing buildings and commit to not 
extending controls further.
4) There are a series of landlord hardship 
provisions, where landlords may petition to 
pass certain operating expenses on to tenants in 
order to cover costs with reasonable profit.
Table 1 shows how the details vary across cities, 
but it also underscores how these systems share 
more policy similarities than differences.
These measures were largely intended to be 
temporary, but like many so-called temporary 
regimes, rent control is the answer to an emergency 
situation that never seems to end. One reason for 
rent control’s persistence is that it redistributes 
benefits from future tenants to present ones. One 
influential study found that, after rent control was 
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expanded to a new set of apartments 
in 1994 in San Francisco, tenants in 
affected buildings were 10–20 percent 
more likely to remain at their 1994 
address compared to tenants in the 
control group. Since rent increases are 
capped at less than the rate of inflation, 
these tenants were (and in some cases 
still are) effectively being subsidized 
to live in their controlled apartments 
for as long as they like. This creates a 
powerful pro-rent-control constituency 
that can be difficult for reform-minded 
policymakers to overcome.
This de facto subsidy to stay in 
place affects tenants’ labor market 
outcomes. One study shows that 
tenants absorb longer commutes 
instead of yielding their rent-controlled 
apartments, suggesting that keeping 
the subsidized housing is more 
valuable to them than moving closer 
to a new job or switching job markets 
altogether. Another study concluded 
that the stronger the local rent-control 
ordinance, the more likely a person was 
to limit their job search to local jobs. 
While rent control may allow workers 
to stay close to high-wage jobs in 
dense urban areas, it is not altogether 
clear that this is in the best interests of 
tenants or the economy in the long run.
Rent control’s distortionary effects 
also extend into housing supply. The 
policies in Table 1 collectively dampen 
landlords’ profits in the controlled 
market. In the case of San Francisco, 
landlords actually lose money since 
rent increases are capped at 60 percent 
of the inflation rate. In growing 
markets, the gap between what a 
landlord receives from a controlled 
apartment and from one that allows 
increases at the market rate compounds 
over time. Because tenants in this 
situation have strong incentives to stay 
longer under rent control, landlords in 
turn try to avoid tenants they suspect 
will be “long-stayers.”
My own research asks: How do 
landlords of rent-controlled properties 
change their housing supply when 
prices rise? Do they bring more units 
to market? Or, in San Francisco, at 
least, have policymakers imposed such 
burdens on landlords that they actually 
remove properties from the market? To 
motivate this question, Figure 1 shows 
evictions by quarter in San Francisco. 
The left axis shows Ellis Act evictions, 
by which landlords evict all tenants and 
withdraw an entire building from the 
market. Ostensibly, this occurs when 
landlords no longer want to operate 
their buildings, and so one might 
expect these evictions to rise when 
the economy slumps and vice versa. 
Instead, Ellis Act evictions spike during 
booms and fall during recessions. The 
right axis shows “just-cause” at-fault 
evictions, mostly tenants being evicted 
for delinquent rent. Since tenants in the 
controlled market are insulated from 
price increases during booms, one 
might expect this type of eviction to 
rise during recessions as tenants’ ability 
to pay falls. Instead, like Ellis Act 
evictions (albeit less sharply), at-fault 
evictions seem to rise in boom periods 
and level off in recessions.
These relationships suggest 
that landlords try to evade rent 
control restrictions when it would 
be especially profitable to do so, 
such as by converting rental units to 
condominiums. To test this hypothesis 
more definitively, I examine how two 
outcomes respond to market price 
increases that affected San Francisco 
neighborhoods differentially between 
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City Subject to 
controls if the 
building is...
Max annual 
allowable rent 
increase
Vacancy 
decontrol?
Just-cause 
evictions?
Rental stock 
coverage (%)
Los Angelesa Built before 
10/1/1978 and 
has 2 or more 
units
Regional CPI 
rate, bounded 
within 3–8%
Yes Yes 85
Oaklandb Built before 
1/1/1983 and 
has 4 or more 
units
Regional CPI 
rate, max of 
10%
Yes Yes 66
New York Cityc Built before 
1/1/1974 and 
has 6 or more 
units
Set by NYC 
rent guidelines 
board annually
No, rent 
increase for 
new base rent 
capped at 20%d
Yes 47
San Josée All rental units 
built before 
9/7/1979
Previously 8%
6/2016-: 5%
Yes No, city-
mandated 
arbitration 
instead
33
Washington, DCf An apartment 
building built 
before 1/1/1976
CPI + 2%, max 
of 10%
No, rent 
increase for 
new base rent 
capped at 10%
Yes 66
San Franciscog Built before 
6/13/1979 and 
has 2 or more 
units
60% of CPI, max 
of 7%
Yes Yes 72
Table 1  Major City Rent Control and Evictions Policies, October 2016
a Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter 151. Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles (2016). 
b Oakland Municipal Code §8.22 et seq. Coverage figure comes Levin (2015). 
c New York State Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, 1997 New York Laws 116; Rent Act of 2015, 2015 New York Laws 20; New 
York State Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, 1974 New York Laws 576 §5-a. Coverage figure comes from Sieg and Yoon 
(2016). 
d In both cities, landlords can appeal for a rent increase on new base rents of up to 30% if rents in comparable units are shown to 
be higher.
e  San José Municipal Code, Apartment Ordinance, Chapter 17.23. Coverage figure is from San José Municipal Ordinance No. 
29730, p. 1.
f  Code of the District of Columbia, Chapter 42. Coverage figure comes from Tatian and Williams (2011). 
g Asquith (forthcoming).
2003 and 2013. The first outcome 
is whether landlords tactically evict 
individual tenants to try to lock in 
higher rents from new tenants. More 
specifically, do landlords use just-
cause evictions to expel long-standing 
but lower-paying tenants? In spite 
of the pattern in the graph, I find no 
statistically significant evidence that 
landlords do this. Instead the evidence 
suggests that landlords of rent-
controlled apartments are less likely 
to turn over their tenants when prices 
rise.
The other outcome is whether 
controlled landlords outright exit the 
market in response to a price increase. 
I find that landlords do in fact respond 
to rising prices by withdrawing 
from the rental market via Ellis Act 
evictions (or, in smaller buildings, 
by withdrawing one unit from the 
market by claiming a relative needs to 
move in). This is a serious response, 
because by law the landlords must pay 
relocation fees and leave these units 
vacant (or filled by a family member) 
for at least three years or be subject to 
sanctions.
The two results confirm that 
the controlled market is distorted 
compared to “normal” housing 
markets. Landlords apparently expect 
to make such little money on the 
controlled market that they conclude 
it’s better to exit the market entirely, at 
least for a few years. If these landlords 
are thus incentivized to reduce supply 
as prices rise, it is hard to see how 
rent control improves housing market 
dynamics in these cities.
So, if existing evidence is that 
rent control is distortionary, why not 
abolish it? We have some evidence 
on what happens when rent control 
is repealed, and the result is generally 
salutary (see, for example, Autor, 
Palmer, and Pathak 2017). In January 
1995, a Massachusetts law banned 
rent controls, mostly affecting units 
in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline. 
Property values in both decontrolled 
and never-controlled units rose, while 
property crime fell, especially in 
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areas with the highest concentration 
of controlled units. Additionally, 
segregation may have decreased.
However, the evidence is not clear 
on whether low- and middle-income 
tenants in fact would have been better 
off without rent control. So, what are 
other remedies to help these groups 
with housing costs? Government 
programs have included Section 8 
housing subsidies, low-income housing 
tax credits to finance new housing, 
and more recently, affordable housing 
mandates. These programs offer some 
help, particularly to poorer renters, 
but generally do little to address the 
housing needs of middle-income 
residents facing excessive rent burdens 
in expensive cities. Rent control’s lack 
of means testing is thus a political 
strength, because it can claim to be the 
rare policy that helps middle-income 
renters as well.
Despite popular demands for 
government intervention on rents, 
economists typically advocate for 
increasing the housing supply. 
Frustratingly, there is little empirical 
evidence on what happens to rent 
prices when the number of housing 
units in a neighborhood rises, with one 
study suggesting prices may not move 
much. Upjohn Institute economist 
Evan Mast, Philadelphia Fed economist 
Davin Reed, and I are currently 
studying this issue using data on unit-
level migrations, rents, and building 
openings.
Irrespective of the ultimate answer, 
rent control is here to stay. The current 
beneficiaries are well-organized, 
numerous, and know what they stand 
to lose from its repeal. The return of 
rent control to the scholarly agenda 
is thus propitiously timed to caution 
policymakers and a frustrated public 
that while soaring rent burdens are 
indeed approaching crisis levels in 
some places, rent control is a policy 
that has yet to deliver on its promise: 
affordable rents for all, not just for the 
few lucky enough to score a controlled 
apartment.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data provided by the San Francisco Rent Board and Kate Pennington, 
University of California, Berkeley.
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Background
The United States, Canada, and 
Japan are the only industrialized 
countries that do not provide universal 
access to paid sick leave. In these 
countries, sick pay is largely provided 
as a fringe benefit by employers on a 
voluntary basis (Heymann et al. 2010). 
In the United States, coverage rates are 
around 65 percent among full-time 
workers; low-income, part-time, and 
service sector workers have coverage 
rates of less than 20 percent (Susser 
and Ziebarth 2016). In a given week of 
the year, Susser and Ziebarth (2016) 
estimate that the total demand for paid 
sick leave sums to 10 percent of the 
workforce in the United States. 
To date, sick leave legislation has 
been passed in 11 states, the District of 
Columbia, and dozens of cities across 
the United States.1 They require that 
employees must have the right to earn, 
accumulate, and take sick days, typically 
up to seven days per year. Some critics 
are concerned that these mandates 
cause substantial wage reductions for 
employees, as well as job losses. Upjohn 
Early Career Research Awardee Nicolas 
R. Ziebarth of Cornell University and 
colleague Stefan Pichler of ETH Zurich 
published an examination of these sick 
pay mandates in the Journal of Human 
Resources (forthcoming). 
Findings
The research team used 
employment and wage data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001 
to 2016 to compare the labor market 
dynamics of the cities and states with 
mandates to “synthetic” control cities 
and states over time. The research 
assessed mandates in nine cities 
(including San Francisco, Washington, 
D.C., and New York City) and four 
states (Connecticut, California, 
Massachusetts, and Oregon).
The synthetic control group method 
(SCGM) is a relatively recent statistical 
method that allows researchers to draw 
causal inference. In this specific case, to 
benchmark the labor market dynamics 
of cities and states that implemented 
a mandate, the SCGM produces a 
very similar synthetic control group 
consisting of fractions of similar 
counties and states. 
Figure 1 illustrates the SCGM 
and some select findings. The left 
column shows the findings for three 
areas—San Francisco, King County, 
and New York City. The right column 
shows the findings for three select 
states, California, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon. The x-axis represents the 
normalized timeline in months up 
to and since the mandates became 
effective, and the y-axis shows the 
NOTE
1. Oakland rent control ordinance. https: 
//oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail 
.aspx?ID=2680738&GUID=BAED7BF3 
-ED56-4A16-A876-37717D4E01D6& 
Options=&Search= (accessed January 11, 
2019).
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Labor Market Effects of 
U.S. Sick Pay Mandates
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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Over the past decade, dozens of cities, eleven states, and the District of Columbia 
have passed sick leave legislation.
n Sick pay mandates allow employees to earn and accumulate one hour of paid sick 
leave credit per 30–40 working hours.
n Comparing employment and wage dynamics in cities and states that mandated 
sick pay with synthetic control regions, there is no evidence that the mandates lead to 
major disruptions of local labor markets.
EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH  •  JANUARY 2019 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
The article draws on research from the forthcoming 
working paper, “Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing 
Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in 
San Francisco,” published by the Upjohn Institute.
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-296
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